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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROGER HOLFELTZ,

:

Case No. 981193-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma conviction of failure to respond to an officer's signal to
stop, a third degree felony, in violation of § 41-5-13.5 (1999), in the Eighth Judicial
District Court of Unitah County, State of Utah, the Honorable A. Lynn Payne, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the court correctly deny defendant's motion to suppress the
trooper's statement to '"wait and stop"?
Standard of Review: "[An appellate court] review[s] the trial court's factual
findings underlying its decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress under a clearly
erroneous standardf,]" whereas the trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for

correctness. State v. McGrath, 928 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992)).
Issue No. 2: Was there sufficient evidence to convict defendant of failure to
respond to an officer's signal?
Standard of Review: A jury verdict will be reversed for insufficient evidence only
when, "after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74, f 18, 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). Circumstantial evidence alone is
sufficient to support a criminal conviction. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah
1997).
Issue No. 3: Does a prior unlawful detention entitle a person to resist an officer's
signal to stop?
Standard of Review: "A question of statutory interpretation presents a question of
law which is reviewed for correctness." American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT
App. 323, f5, 14 P.3d 698 (citations omitted).
Issue No, 4: Does defendant provide sufficient record evidence to show that
AP&P filed a motion to terminate defendant's probation and that the trial court denied
that motion?

2

Standard of Review: On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of providing the
reviewing court with an adequate record to prove his allegations. See State v. Penman,
964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah
1982). "Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral
allegation which the review[ing] court has no power to determine. [An appellate court]
simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts
unsupported by the record." Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d at 293. When faced with an "'an
[inadequate record on appeal, [an appellate court] must assume the regularity of the
proceedings below.'" Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162 (citing State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,
405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-13.5 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged by information with attempted criminal
homicide, a first degree felony; failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third
degree felony; and improper registration, and failure to carry a driver's license, class C
misdemeanors. R. 1-2. A claim in forfeiture for defendant's vehicle was also made
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.7 (1999). Id. These charges were later reduced to

3

aggravated assault and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, third degree
felonies- R. 92-94; 433:28-29, 160-61.
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to suppress, and a hearing was held. R.
600. The parties stipulated that the court could base its factual findings on the transcript
of defendant's preliminary hearing. R. 389:9. The court entered findings and denied
defendant's motion. R. 389:9-23; 433:14-28.
This case was tried before a jury, who convicted defendant of failure to respond to
an officer's signal to stop and acquitted him of aggravated assault. R. 273-76; 434:50001.
The court sentenced defendant to a term of 30 days in jail and probation for 36
months. R. 400-02, 450-54; 474:46-57. Defendant timely appeals his conviction. R.
461-62.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On the afternoon of February 16, 1997, pinning Trooper Jon Gardner partially
inside defendant's car door, defendant dragged the trooper for at least thirty feet despite
his audible and visual signals to stop. R. 433:182-189; 434:281-84, 326-27.
Responding to a radio call Earlier that morning, Officer Rich Whittaker stopped
and arrested a female driver for failing to use child safety restraints on her four-year-old

•The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Chaney, 1999 UT App. 309,f2, 989 P.2d 1091.
4

daughter. R. 433:172-75; 434:274-75, 347, 350. Officer Whittaker was taking the woman
to jail and needed assistance with her children. Id. Troopers Gardner and Brian Blevins
responded to Officer Whittaker's radio call. R. 433:174-75; 434:274-75. Upon arrival,
they attempted to console the children and find a family member who could come get the
them. R. 433:174-75. Raymond Sadlier, the children's grandfather, agreed to pick up the
children. R. 434:347. Sadlier invited his son, his son's wife, defendant, and defendant's
wife to accompany him. R. 434:347-50.
When defendant arrived at the scene, he immediately confronted the troopers,
demanding their names and badge numbers. R. 433:175; 434:275-76. Defendant
appeared upset R. 433:175. When facing Trooper Gardner, he stood uncomfortably
close, and was asked to step away. Id. Defendant taunted the troopers, telling them that
they had violated "constitutional rights/' and demanding that their vehicles be impounded
as evidence. R. 433:175; 434:275-76. Despite defendant's contemptuous demeanor, the
children were released to their grandfather and all three troopers left. R. 433:175-76;
434:276.
Returning to the scene. As the troopers drove away, Officer Whittaker radioed
and requested that troopers Gardner and Blevins return to the scene and obtain the name
of the suspect's child. R. 433:176; 434:276. Expressing some hesitation, they complied.
433:176-77; 434:276.
Upon his arrival, Trooper Gardner parked behind defendant's vehicle, which was
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located on the shoulder of the highway. R. 433:177-79; 434:276-77. As they approached
defendant's vehicle, the troopers noticed that the registration on defendant's car, bearing
Washington license plates, was expired by several months. R. 433:180-81; 434:277-79.
The event escalates. The troopers encountered defendant and the others at the rear
of defendant's car. R.433:179; 434:277. Defendant appeared to be acting as the voice of
the group. R. 433:180; 434:277. The troopers asked if they could have the name of the
suspect's four-year-old daughter. Id. Defendant responded, stating "you can just call her
daughter number one." R. 433:180; 434:277, 382. At that point, Trooper Gardner
advised defendant that his registration was expired. R. 433:180; 434:277, 279.
Defendant responded by asking if Trooper Gardner was a federal tax collector, claiming
that he was exempt from Utah registration because of his Washington license plates. R.
433:180; 434:277. As Trooper Blevins went back to his patrol car to call dispatch,
Trooper Gardner asked several times for defendant's license and registration. R. 433:180,
182; 434:279. Defendant refused to comply. R. 433:182; 434:279. Defendant was
informed that the troopers were impounding his car, to which he replied, "like hell you
are." R. 433:182-83; 434:353, 384.
"Wait and stop." Suddenly, defendant turned and moved quickly toward the
driver's side door of his car. R. 433:182-83, 326. Trooper Gardner followed behind
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defendant, commanding him to tvwait and stop." R. 433:184, 326-27.2 Hoping to move
the car onto private property and avoid arrest, defendant ignored Trooper Gardner's
commands, quickly got into his vehicle, and started it. R. 433:183; 434:353, 385.
Trooper Gardner lunged inside the open door, trying to turn off the key. Id. As
defendant closed the door, the upper half of Trooper Gardner's body became pinned in
the car. R. 433:184-85; 434:280-83, 327. Trooper Gardner struggled to free himself as
defendant revved the accelerator and drove the car forward. R. 433:184-85; 434:281-84.
Trooper Gardner also attempted to grab defendant in an effort to stop the car. R.
434:351-53, 355-60, 385-86, 416. Noticing the struggle, Trooper Blevins sprinted after
the car to help free Trooper Gardner. R. 434:281. Defendant drove forward between
thirty to sixty feet with Trooper Gardner partially inside the car. R. 433:189; 434:282.
Eventually, Trooper Gardner was able to free his head and body, and then each arm
individually. R. 433:185-89.
The troopers ran back to their vehicles and pursued defendant with their
emergency lights on as defendant drove into a parking lot and stopped. R. 433:190;
434:281, 284-85, 327, 390-91. Defendant was then taken into custody. Id. As a result
of this incident, Trooper Gardner suffered injuries to his left shoulder, left elbow, and
right knee. R. 434:311-15.

2

Trooper Gardner testified that he may have said either "wait" or "stop," or both
words. R. 433:184. However, he was certain that in some way he commanded defendant
not to leave. Id.
7

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
POINT I: Although defendant agrees with the trial court's ruling that he was
unlawfully detained, he claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to
suppress Trooper Gardner's verbal signal to stop and defendant's actions to resist which
followed the unlawful detention. Defendant's claim lacks merit, however, because the
evidence which he seeks to suppress falls outside the reach of the exclusionary rule.
First, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to statements made by a
defendant or a lay witness, which are illegally obtained by the police. Statements made
by the police are not the type of verbal evidence which not admissible under the
exclusionary rule. Second, defendant points only to a "but for" causal connection
between the unlawful detention and his subsequent actions. He argues that but for the
unlawful detention, his resulting crime would not have occurred. Standing alone, this
"but for" argument was rejected in Wong Sun v. United States.
Third, even if defendant were able to show a sufficient causal connection between
his unlawful detention and his subsequent actions, his claim still fails because his violent
actions constituted a new and independent crime. Where a defendant reacts to an
unlawful police action with violence, evidence of that violence is admissible as a new and
independent crime. Finally, defendant's claim defies sound public policy. The intended
effect of defendant's motion is to suppress all evidence of his subsequent crime. Such a
rule of law would allow a defendant to commit serious crimes against a police officer
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after an unlawful detention without fear of prosecution.
POINT II: Defendant also challenges the jury's verdict, claiming that there was
insufficient evidence to show that the arresting officer gave a visual or audible signal to
stop, and that he was the operator of the vehicle when the signal to stop was given. This
claim first fails on procedural grounds because defendant fails to properly marshal all the
evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Notwithstanding defendant's failure to marshal
the evidence, there was ample evidence introduced at trial which supports a conviction for
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop.
POINT III: Defendant next claims that the trial court erroneously prevented him
from presenting a mistake of law defense to the jury. In essence defendant argues that
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5(1) requires that a signal to stop must be lawful, thus
permitting a citizen to actively resist an unlawful signal to stop. Defendant's claim fails
because it runs contrary to the plain meaning of section 41-6-13.5(1) and relevant case
law. In any event, even if section 41-6-13.5(1) required a lawful signal to stop,
defendant's claim still fails because troopers acted within their authority.
POINT IV: Finally, defendant claims the trial court erred in denying AP&P's
motion to terminate probation by making findings without any evidence or hearing.
However, defendant's claim is not supported by the record. Accordingly, this Court must
presume the regularity of the proceedings below. In any event, where the term of
probation remains unchanged, no evidentiary hearing is required before a trial court
rejects a recommendation for early termination.
9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
TROOPER'S VERBAL SIGNAL TO STOP AND HIS
RESULTING CRIMINAL CONDUCT
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred by not suppressing evidence
allegedly obtained as a result of an unlawful detention. Br. of Aplt. at 9-11. Defendant
does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, nor its ruling that an illegal level two
encounter occurred. Br. of Aplt. at 9.3 Instead, defendant argues that "the verbage [sic]
alleged as the signal to stop" was the direct result of the illegal detention, and therefore
the trooper's statement and defendant's resulting crime should be excluded as fruit of the
poisonous tree. Br. of Aplt at 10-11.
At the suppression hearing prior to trial, the court entered the following
conclusions of law:
1.

Trooper Gardner did not have an articulable suspicion that defendant
had committed or was about to commit a crime, yet he requested
defendant's driver's license and registration information while
detaining defendant. As a result, defendant was unlawfully detained.

5

Although defendant does not dispute the trial court's findings of fact, he does not
accurately state the factual findings in his brief. For example, defendant's statement that
"[t]he trooper did not check with dispatch to see if [defendant's] license plate was
actually expired, but assumed that under Washington law, the stickers indicated an
expiration date rather than an issue date for the plate[,]" is misleading. Br. of Aplt. at 9.
The trial court found that Trooper Blevins also noticed that defendant's license plate
registration had expired and was about to relay that information to dispatch when his
communication was interrupted by defendant's physical altercation with Trooper Gardner.
R. 389:13.
10

2.

Defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that the
evidence he sought to suppress was found as a result of an unlawful
detention. Therefore, no causal connection existed between the
unlawful detention and the evidence defendant sought to suppress.

3.

Assuming defendant had established a causal connection,
defendant's actions following the unlawful detention constituted an
independent intervening act sufficient to attenuate any possible taint.

4.

The troopers could not have foreseen that defendant would act in a
criminal manner when they arrived. Since defendant's conduct was
not foreseeable, the troopers could not have acted improperly in
order to get evidence.

5.

As a matter of public policy, defendant's argument fosters a rule of
law which encourages the commission of crimes and endangers
police officers making arrests.

R. 389:19-23.
"The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, as enunciated in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), requires the exclusion at trial of evidence obtained through a
violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments." State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 n.5
(Utah 1996). Such evidence includes physical materials discovered by the police and
verbal statements offered to police by a defendant or by lay witnesses either during or as a
direct result of an unlawful invasion. McGrath, 928 P2d at 1036 (citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1963)). Evidence is not "fruit of the poisonous
tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the
police. Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Rather, the focus is on ' Vhether the
evidence resulted primarily from the exploitation of the illegality or by means sufficiently
11

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
"[S]ince the cost of excluding live-witness testimony often will be greater, the law
requires for exclusion a closer more direct link between the illegal conduct and the
testimony." Id. (citing United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278 (1978) (quotations
omitted)).
Defendant's claim fails because the evidence he seeks to suppress is not
suppressible.
A.

Defendant's novel application of Wong Sun is not supported by law.

Defendant seeks to suppress not a statement discovered by Trooper Gardner, but
uttered by him. Defendant cites no cases, and the State is aware of none, in support of his
novel application of Wong Sun.
B.

Defendant's "but for" argument is untenable.

Defendant points only to a '"but for" causal connection between the unlawful
detention and his subsequent actions. Br. of Aplt. at 10-11. Defendant argues that but for
the unlawful detention, no command to 'Vait and stop" would have been given, therefore
his resulting crime would not have come to light. Id. This argument was unequivocally
rejected in Wong Sun. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
There, "[t]he Supreme Court expressly declined to hold 'that all evidence is fruit of the
poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions
of the police." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (citing Wong Sun, 371
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U.S. at 487-88)); e.g., McGrath, 928 P2d at 1036. Defendant bears the burden of
proving a direct link between the unlawful detention and the evidence sought to be
suppressed. McGrath, 928 P2d at 1036 (citing Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 278). Here,
defendant fails to provide a closer more direct link between the illegal conduct and the
officer's statement. See id. Specifically, defendant fails to show that the officer's
statement to tcwait and stop" resulted primarily from the exploitation of the unlawful stop.
See id. In sum, defendant's "but for" argument is unpersuasive. See id.
C.

Defendant's charged crime was new and independent.

Assuming arguendo that defendant was able to establish a causal connection
between the unlawful detention and the evidence of his aggressive behavior, defendant's
claim still fails because his charged crime of aggravated assault constituted an new crime.
The court's have traditionally held that where a defendant reacts to unlawful police action
with violence, evidence of this new crime is admissible. See United States v.
Waupekenay, 973 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir.1992) (after an illegal entry by police, evidence
that the defendant pointed gun at police was admissible as a new crime); People v. Smith,
870 P.2d 617 (Colo. Ct. App.1994) (defendant was charged for responding to an illegal
stop by twice swerving his car toward the police officer's car in an apparent attempt to hit
it); People v. VillarreaU 604 N.E.2d 923 (111. 1992) (attack on officers who entered
defendant's premises to arrest another constituted a new crime); State v. Combs, 398
N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1987) (after illegal stop of vehicle, defendant was charged for rolling
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her window up on an officer's arm and driving off); State v. Gregg, 615 N.W.2d 515, 52324 (N.D. 2000) ("The function of deterring police misconduct, does not extend to
evidence of an independent crime even though it was precipitated by an unlawful search
by the government;'); State v. Mien, 901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995) (as wildlife agents
illegally came over fence onto defendant's property, defendant called on his dogs to attack
the agents, which they did). Defendant's alleged assault upon the trooper was free and
independent of the detention, thus constituting a new crime. See State v. Saavedra, 396
N.W.2d304(N.D.1986).4
D.

Defendant's claim does not foster sound public policy.

Defendant's claim also defies sound public policy. Defendant argues for the
suppression of his subsequent crime. The trial court correctly noted, however, that under
defendant's theory any violent action by a defendant, including murder, which follows an
illegal stop would be suppressed. R. 389:22-23; 600:60. See State v. Miller, 194 S.E.2d
353 (N.C. 1973) ("Application of the exclusionary rule in such fashion would in effect
give the victims of illegal searches a license to assault and murder the officer involved—a
result manifestly unacceptable."). See also State v. Miskimins, 435 N.W.2d 217 (S.D.

'See also People v. Mathews, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 330, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(defendant's unlawful use of firearm against police was not justified by illegal police
actions); State v. White, 642 So.2d 842, (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (commission of an
independent crime during or after execution of an illegal warrant may be charged, even if
evidence seized relates to the commission of that crime); City ofMaplewood v. Marti, 891
S.W.2d 500, 504 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (violation of a defendant's constitutional rights
does not confer license to commit new crimes).
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1989). Based upon that reasoning, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's
argument fosters a rule of law which would encourage the commission of crimes and
endanger police officers. R. 389:22-23. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 (strict adherence to
the exclusionary rule "imposes greater costs on the legitimate demands of law
enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent purposes.") (citations and
quotations omitted)). The exclusionary rule simply does not extend to this extreme. State
v. Balduc, 414 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing City of St. Louis Park v.
Berg, 433 N.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Minn. 1988) (assault on police officers who illegally entered
defendant's house should not be suppressed) and State v. Combs, 394 N.W.2d 567, 569
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (evidence of obstructing a legal process which occurred after an
unlawful stop was not suppressive)) rev 'd on other grounds, 398 N.W.2d 563, 565 n.2
(Minn. 1987).
Given the various fundamental flaws of defendant's argument the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
FAVORING THE JURY'S VERDICT; IN ANY EVENT,
THE STATE ADDUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict
on two grounds: first, defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that the
arresting officer gave a visual or audible signal to stop, and second, defendant claims that
there was insufficient evidence to show that he was the operator of the vehicle when the
signal to stop was given. Br. of Aplt. at 11-15.5 This Court should not consider the
merits of these claims, however, because defendant has not properly marshaled the
evidence as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The rule provides in part:
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence
that supports the challenged finding.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). "[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a
desire merely to have pertinent excerpts from the record readily available to a reviewing
court." West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Ca, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.
1991). Rather, "[cjounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and
fully assume the adversary's position/' by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which wupports the very

5

To avoid unnecessary repetition, the State combines defendant's second and third
arguments and addresses them together in Point II. See Br. of Aplt. at 11-15.
16

findings the appellant resists." Id. After gathering "this magnificent array of supporting
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id.
A.

Defendant has not adequately marshaled the evidence.

Contrary to rule 24(a)(9), on appeal defendant only briefly mentions two facts
supporting the jury's verdict: (1) Trooper Gardner told defendant to wait or stop when
defendant was walking toward his vehicle; and (2) the prosecutor argued the trooper's
attempts to grab and pull defendant from the car constituted a visual or audible signal to
stop. Br. of Aplt. at 13. Instead, defendant dwells only upon those facts supporting his
position, representing that "[n]o other evidence of any visual or audible signal to stop was
presented to the [c]ourt." Br. of Aplt at 11.
Defendant's argument omits the following additional facts:
1.

Upon learning from Trooper Gardner that his car would be
impounded, defendant walked quickly toward the driver's side door
of his vehicle. R. 433:182-83; 434:326-27, 418.

2.

While walking away, defendant was commanded to stop by a trooper
in uniform. R. 433:175, 183-84. Defendant ignored the officer's
command, entered the driver's side car door, and attempted to start
his vehicle with the officer following closing behind. R.433:183-84;
434:326-27.

3-

At trial defendant admitted that he was the owner and operator of the
car. R. 434:400-05.

4.

Ray Sadlier, a passenger in defendant's vehicle, saw defendant get in
his car and start the car while cursing and stating that he had to
quickly move his car onto private property. R. 434:351-53, 358.

5.

Defendant appeared agitated and told Sadlier that the troopers were
trying to arrest him for no reason. R. 434:351, 353.
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Trooper Gardner lunged into the vehicle, attempting to disable the
car by grabbing for the keys. R. 433:183-84, 186.
Upon starting the vehicle, defendant revved the engine and the car
emitted a large plume of smoke as defendant moved the car forward
with the officer lodged partially inside the vehicle. R. 433:185;
434:280-83.
Sadlier witnessed the trooper attempting to grab defendant while the
vehicle was moving. R. 434:351-53, 355-60, 385-86, 416, 429-30.
Trooper Gardner appeared to be pulling as hard as he could. R.
434:358.
Trooper Gardner testified that he grabbed inside the car for the
purpose of stopping the vehicle. R. 434:438-39, 444.
With his left hand, defendant held the car door shut on the trooper
while he moved the vehicle approximately fifty to sixty feet with
Trooper Gardner visibly struggling to free his head, torso, and arms.
R. 433:184-89.
Jana Houghton, a passerby, observed defendant "banging" the car
door on the officer's body. R. 434:326-27.
Trooper Gardner was pushing with extreme force on the driver's side
window and door of the car. R. 433:188-89.
During the event, Trooper Gardner was panicking and scared. R.
433:186-89. Such emotions were apparent from his facial
expressions which were visible from inside the car. R. 434:280-82,
416-17.
While the car was moving, Trooper Gardner was "pedaling as hard
as [he] could to keep up with [defendant]." R. 434:184-88. This
shuffling of his feet could be heard by the occupants of the car. R.
434:352, 422.
Trooper Blevins was observed sprinting as fast as he could after the
car but was unable to catch it. R. 433:189-90; 434:280-81.
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16.

After Trooper Gardner was freed from defendant's vehicle, both
Trooper Gardner and Trooper B levins pursued defendant into the
IF A parking lot using their vehicle lights. R. 434:327, 390-91.

Marshaling requires that defendant list all the evidence that supports the verdict
and then explain how that evidence is not enough to sustain the conviction. See State v.
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^[17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. In light of the evidence defendant neglected
to marshal, defendant failed to meet his burden.
B.

The evidence amply supports the jury's verdict.

Notwithstanding defendant's failure to properly marshal the evidence, on the
merits defendant's claim fails. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, this Court will reverse only when, "after viewing the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence is
i s sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he
or she was convicted.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18, 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted).
Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a criminal conviction. State v.
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997). "When findings of all required elements of the
crime can be reasonably made from the evidence, including the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from it, [the Court] stop[s] [its] inquiry and sustain[s] the verdict." State v.
Colwell 2000 UT 8, fll2, 994 P.2d 177.
The jury convicted defendant of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop
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pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5(1) (1999). R. 273-76; 434:500-01. Given the
facts of this case, to establish a defendant's guilt under this offense the State must first
show that defendant, as the driver of a vehicle, willfully or wantonly disregarded an
officer's visual or audible signal to stop his vehicle. State v Simpson, 904 P.2d 709, 712
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Secondly, the State must show that the crime was completed in
one of two ways: Either (1) the defendant operated his vehicle in a way that endangers
any person, or (2) defendant attempted to flee or elude the officer. Id. "Accordingly, a
violation of section 41-6-13.5 could be characterized either as "failing to respond to a
peace officer's signal to stop" or as "fleeing or eluding a peace officer.'" Id.
In State v. Simpson, this Court noted that "wanton disregard" occurs where the
driver of the vehicle is aware that his conduct may result in a substantial and unjustifiable
risk, yet he continues to engage in such conduct. Id. at 713 (citing State v. Johnson, 364
P.2d 1019 (1961)). As such, "wanton" is equivalent to reckless, heedless, malicious, and
foolhardy behavior. Id. (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1582 (6th ed. 1990)).
Given that definition, this Court need not look far to find evidence establishing
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Trooper Gardner testified that he
"commanded" defendant to stop and defendant ignored his command. R. 433:183-84.6

6

Although some conflicting testimony was offered at trial, given the verdict, the
jurors believed the trooper's testimony over that of the other conflicting witnesses. See
State v. BlubaugK 904 P.2d 688, 694-95 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("it is within the province
of the jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and
reject [] alternate hypotheses.").
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Defendant quickly walked toward the driver's seat of the vehicle, got in, and started his
car. R. 433:182-84, 434:351-60. Trooper Gardiner lunged toward the keys, attempting
to disable the car. R. 433:183. Defendant continued to drive the vehicle for
approximately fifty to sixty feet while Trooper Gardner visibly struggled to free himself.
R. 433:183-89; 434:280-81. Ray Sadlier, defendant's passenger, testified that Trooper
Gardner grabbed defendant, attempting to pull defendant from the moving vehicle. R.
434:351-53, 355-60. Trooper Blevins visibly chased the car. R. 433:189-90; 434:280-81
Despite the trooper's peril, defendant's only concern was getting his car onto "private
property'Vhere he believed that it could not be impounded. R. 434:351-60.
From this evidence the jury could reasonably satisfy all the elements of the crime:
(1) that defendant was the operator of the vehicle; (2) that his actions indicted a willful
and wanton disregard of an officer's audible and visible signal to stop; and (3) that
defendant operated his vehicle in a manner that endangered Trooper Gardner and he was
attempting to elude the impound of his vehicle. See Simpson, 904 P.2d at 713. Here, the
evidence presented to the jury was not "so insufficient that reasonable minds could not
have reached the verdict." Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at f42.7

7

Defendant inappropriately inserts an additional and unrelated argument opposing
a jury instruction under his insufficiency claims. Defendant objects to jury instruction no
17 which lists the elements for failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. Br. of
Aplt. at 14-15. This claim should not be considered on the merits because it is raised for
the first time on appeal and is inadequately. For the first time, defendant claims that
instruction no. 17 leads a jury to believe that a signal could be given at some moment
other than when defendant was operating his vehicle. Br. of Aplt. at 14-15. Defendant
21

POINT III
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THERE IS
NO RIGHT TO RESIST AN UNLAWFUL DETENTION
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN- 41-6-13.5(1); NOT ONLY IS
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM UNSUPPORTED BY
STATUTE, BUT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM ALSO FAILS
ON THE MERITS BECAUSE THE TROOPERS WERE
ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR
AUTHORITY
After denying defendant's motion to suppress prior to trial, the court instructed
defense counsel and the prosecutor not to bring the court's ruling on the motion to
suppress to the attention of the jury. R. 682-83. The court did not, however, restrict
counsel in any way concerning bringing facts to the jury's attention. Id. Now, defendant
claims that the trial court's instruction prevented defendant from presenting a mistake of
law defense. Br. of Aplt. at 15. Defendant asserts that his belief that his detention was

did not raise that objection in the trial court, and thus failed to preserve it. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 19(c). Moreover, at trial defense counsel acquiesced to the use of that
instruction, thus inviting the alleged error that defendant claims on appeal. R. 434:45463. See State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (defendant's claim is
rejected where he invited the very error complained of on appeal). Additionally,
defendant's argument is deficient in that it fails to comply with the briefing requirements
of rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and neglects to demonstrate prejudice
from all the submitted instructions viewed together. Br. of Aplt. at 14. See Salt Lake City
v. Srnoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (reversal based upon a jury
instruction is only appropriate where the defendant demonstrates prejudice stemming
from the instructions viewed in the aggregate). Because this claim is raised for the first
time on appeal and is inadequately briefed, it should not be considered on the merits. See
State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT Ct. App. 305,ffi[25,27, 989 P.2d 503 (refusing to consider an
inadequately briefed issue); State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (unless he
raises plain error, a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is barred
from raising it for the first time on appeal).
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unlawful permitted him to resist trooper's signal to stop. Br. of Aplt. at 15-19. In
essence, defendant interprets section 41-6-13.5(1) as providing that, where the troopers
initiate an unlawful action, he is free to ignore or actively resist the troopers actions
without fear of prosecution under that statute. Defendant's interpretation is untenable.
"When construing a statute, [an appellate court's] primary purpose is to give effect
to the intent of the Legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve/'
Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App. 323 at If 15 (citations and quotations omitted). "Additionally,
[an appellate court] presume[s] that the Legislature used each term advisedly, and
[therefore, that court] gives effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning." Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
A.

In light of Gardiner and its progeny, under Utah Code Ann. § 41-613.5(1) defendant was not entitled to actively resist an unlawful
detention.

In State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court
considered whether a person is entitled to forcibly resist an illegal police search.
Distinguishing its earlier opinion in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975), the
Court determined that there was no common law right to resist an unlawful search, and
therefore that any right to resist arrest "must be grounded in the specific code sections
under which [a defendant] is convicted." Id. at 574. Accord Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App.
323 atffljlO-17;State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) affd, 973
P.2d 975 (Utah 1998); State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 1006-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
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Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1008-12 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) cert, denied, 925
P.2d 963 (Utah 1996).
Here, pursuant to the law outlined in Gardiner and its progeny, defendant must
show that the language of section 41-6-13.5(1) permits him the right to resist the trooper's
signal to stop. Section 41-6-13.5(1) provides:
An operator who receives a visual or audible signal from a peace
officer to bring his vehicle to a stop may not operate his vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the
operation of any vehicle or person and may not attempt to flee or elude a
peace officer by vehicle or other means.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5(1). The plain language of section 41-6-13.5(1) requires only
that a peace officer issue a visual or audible signal to stop. Id. The statute neither states
nor suggests that the signal must be predicated upon lawful police actions. Accordingly,
the illegality of the troopers' actions prior to the signal to stop do not justify defendant's
resistance. See Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574-75; Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1011. 8

8

"Other states that have examined this issue have consistently determined that
illegal police conduct does not justify a defendant interfering with a detention or arrest."
Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App. at fl3 (citing Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909, 911, 914 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1992) (defendant could not resist arrest even though disorderly conduct charge
was invalid); People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 36-37 (Cal. 1969) (duty to refrain from
resisting unlawful arrest does not violate Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable seizures); Kessler v. Barowsky, 931 P.2d 641, 650 (Idaho 1997) (person
cannot resist arrest if he knows he is being arrested by a police officer); State v. Logan,
654 P.2d 492, 495 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (person cannot resist arrest by law enforcement
even if he believes arrest is unlawful); State v. Laughlin, 933 P.2d 813, 814-15 (Mont.
1997) (same); Fugere v. State, Taxation and Revenue Dep't, Motor Vehicle Div., 897 P.2d
216, 223 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (legal challenge to unlawful arrest can be raised after the
arrest, rather than by resisting arrest); State v. Castle, 616 P.2d 510, 512 (Or. Ct. App.
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In any event, whether the police had the reasonable suspicion to detain defendant
is immaterial to defendant's conviction, because defendant was in no position to
determine on his own whether the troopers' actions were lawful. See Pena-Flores, 2000
UT App. 323 at ^[17. '"[Q]uestion[s] of legality must be determined in subsequent
judicial proceedings, not in the street.'" Id. (citing Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574).
B.

Defendant was not entitled to resist the troopers5 actions because they
acted within the scope of their authority.

Defendant claims that the trial court's ruling deprived him of the defense that he
was entitled to resist the troopers' actions since they were acting outside the scope of their
authority. Br. of Aplt. at 15-19. He relies on Gardiner's dicta that an officer is required
to act within the scope of his authority. Br. of Aplt. at 16.
This claim fails for three reasons. First, defendant concedes that unlike the statute
at issue in Gardiner, section 41-6-13.5(1) does not contain language requiring that a
peace officer must be acting within the scope of his authority when a signal to stop is
given. Second, in any event, the troopers did act within the scope of their duty. Third,
the trial court's ruling did not preclude defendant from making this argument.

1980) (generally person cannot resist arrest even when person knows he is innocent);
State v. Mather, 626 P.2d 44, 47 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure does not create right to react unreasonably to an illegal
detention)).
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(1)

Defendant concedes that the scope of the troopers9 authority is
not referenced in section 41-6-13.5(1).

Defendant cites Gardiner, correctly noting that based upon the specific statute at
issue in that case, the Court determined that a citizen is not entitled to resist an officer
acting within the scope of his authority. Br. of Aplt. at 16. See Gardiner, 814 P.2d at
574-75. Defendant then concedes that "[n]o such requirement is included in the Failure
to Respond statute in this case." Id. Given defendant's concession, the scope of the
troopers' authority is not at issue in this case. Therefore defendant was not harmed by the
trial court's ruling.
(2)

The troopers acted within the scope of their authority.

"Where [an] officer is not acting wholly outside the scope of his or her authority,
the police action many not be resisted." Id. at 574. The basic determination is '"whether
an officer is doing what he or she was employed to do or is engaging in a personal frolic
of his or her own." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Objective factors such as
whether the officer was on duty, in uniform, and pursuing official police business, are
central to this inquiry. Smooth 921 P.2d at 1010-11.
Defendant does not deny that the Smoot standard was met. Rather, he claims that
Trooper Gardner's use of force was excessive and outside the scope of his authority. Br.
of Aplt. at 16-19. Specifically, defendant labels Trooper Gardner's alleged attempts to
grab or pull him from a moving car as excessive. Id. Based upon that allegation,
defendant claims that pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-406 he was justified in
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defending his personal property from the police. Id. This claim lacks merit because the
jury's guilty verdict indicates that Trooper Gardner's actions were appropriate under the
circumstances. Also, section 76-2-406 was not intended to include the actions of a peace
officer acting in the course of his duty. See Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 576; Smoot, 921 P.2d
at 1009-10; Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 616-17. Finally, defendant provoked the use offeree by
his action to flee, draging the trooper. See Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1011 n.9 (citing State v.
Nunes, 546 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Robinson, 253 S.E.2d 311,
315 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)).
(3)

The trial court's order did not prevent defendant from
presenting evidence of the troopers' actions nor from arguing
that they acted outside the scope of their authority.

The trial court's order did not preclude defendant from exploring the scope of the
troopers' actions, nor from arguing that they acted outside the scope of their authority.
The order specifically stated that defendant was not restricted in any way concerning the
bringing of facts to the jury's attention. R. 682-83. If defendant failed to bring the
troopers' any facts to the jury's attention, it was only because he neglected to do so or
because they were nonexistent. The order only precluded defendant from mentioning the
court's ruling concerning the unlawful detention. R. 682-83. Defendant was not
prevented from arguing his belief that his actions were predicated upon what he perceived
to be an unlawful detention.
Because section 41-6-13.5(1) does not permit defendant the right to resist an
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unlawful detention, and the troopers acted within the scope of their duty, the trial court
correctly prevented defendant from mentioning its ruling regarding the illegality of
defendant's detention to the jury.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN DENYING AP&P'S PROBATION
RECOMMENDATION WITHOUT A HEARING IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, THEREFORE
REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE
PRESUMED; IN ANY EVENT, WHERE THE TERM OF
PROBATION REMAINS UNCHANGED, NO
EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT REJECTS A RECOMMENDATION
FOR EARLY TERMINATION
Defendant claims that on August 1, 2000, the trial court erred by denying AP&P's
motion to terminate probation without a hearing and evidentiary findings. Br. of Aplt. at
7-8, 19.9 The record contains two recommendations by AP&P for early termination of
probation. R. 678-79, 727-32. The first recommendation was submitted to the trial court
on March 11, 1999 and the second was submitted on January 1, 2000. Id. In response,
the trial court treated the first recommendation as a "motion/' but denied them both. R.
675-76, 680-81, 727-32. The record does not, however, contain a more recent
recommendation or "motion" by AP&P, nor the August 1, 2000 order cited by defendant
in his brief.
9

The State's inquiry suggests that defendant's probation term has ended, making
this issue is moot. See State ex rel S.K., 1999 UT App. 261, ^8, 987 P.2d 616 (except
under limited circumstances, advisory opinions are not appropriate on moot issues).
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On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of providing the reviewing court with an
adequate record to prove his allegations. See Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162. "Absent that
record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which the
review[ing] court has no power to determine. [An appellate court] simply cannot rule on a
question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record."
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d at 293. When faced with an '"an [inadequate record on appeal,
[an appellate court] must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.'" Penman, 964
P.2dat 1162.
Defendant provides no record citation for "AP&P's motion," nor for the trial
court's "August 1, 2000 order." See Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 24(a)(7) and (e)
("All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule."). Further, the
documents defendant relies on are not a part of the record on appeal. Absent record
support for defendant's claim, regularity of the proceedings must be presumed. See
Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162.
In any event, the decision to modify probation is in the discretion of the trial court.
State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (1999) ("[probation may be terminated at any time at the
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discretion of the court. . .").10 No evidentiary hearing is necessary where a
recommendation for early termination is offered and the term of probation remains
unchanged. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i) (1999) (an evidentiary hearing is
only required where probation is modified or extended). Therefore, even if on August 1,
2000 this court considered and rejected AP&P's recommendation without an evidentiary
hearing, such an action would have been within the trial court's discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction for failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop.
RESPECTFULLY SUBM.TTED this j Z ^ d a y of March, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

Y:. COLEMERE
Assistant Attorney General

l0

In support of his position, defendant cites only cases pertaining to sentencing
issues. Br. of Aplt. at 19. Those cases are not, however, analogous the probation
modification issue he raises on appeal. See State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (citing the standard of review for a sentencing decision); State v. McCovey, 803
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990) (the trial court must consider all legally relevant factors when
imposing sentence).
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 2. EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC REGULATIONS
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 2000 General Session
41-6-13.5 Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop --Fleeing -- Causing
property damage or bodily injury --Suspension of driver's license -- Forfeiture
of vehicle --Penalties.

(1) (a) An operator who receives a visual or audible signal from a peace
officer to bring his vehicle to a stop may not operate his vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation
of any vehicle or person and may not attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means.
(b) A person who violates Subsection (1)(a) is guilty of a felony of the
third degree. The court shall, as part of any sentence under this Subsection
(1), impose a fine of not less than $1,000.
(2) (a) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes
death or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not
amounting to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second
degree.
(b) The court shall, as part of any sentence under this Subsection (2),
impose a fine of not less than $5,000.
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other
section, a person who violates Subsection (1)(a) or (2)(a) shall have his
driver's license revoked pursuant to Subsection 53-3-220(1) (a) (ix) for a period
of one year.
(b) The court shall forward the report of the conviction to the division. If
the person is the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the
court shall notify the division and the division shall notify the appropriate
officials in the licensing state.
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Force in defense of property.

A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another
tfhen and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal
property:
(1) lawfully in his possession; or
(2) lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or
(3) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect.
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77-18-1 Suspension of sentence --Pleas held in abeyance --Probation -Supervision --Presentence investigation --Standards --Confidentiality --Terms
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extension --Hearings --Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or
conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or
execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place
the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private
organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence
investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of
services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for
review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to
implement the supervision and investigation standards.
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(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
Dther criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact
report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation
of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence
for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence
investigation report from the department or information from other sources about
the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of complete
restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a
recommendation from the department regarding the payment of court-ordered
restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the
Dffense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim
Dr the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon
:he victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the trial court's
sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement
Df pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department
regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4).
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
iiagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are
protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing
as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to
:he defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing.
\ny alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not
Deen resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be
Drought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report
vith the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be
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resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the
record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence
investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be
considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require
that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by the court
as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of
electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including
the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest
in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate;
and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own
expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or
vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with
Subsection 77-18-1(10).
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(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 3 6 months probation in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or
infractions.
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction
of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited
purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of
State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show
cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete
report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause
to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and
an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or
extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
rearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
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subject ! s authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on
the victim or the victim's household.
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation
under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406
and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to
the department in accordance with Subsection (17).
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the
court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate
law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the
defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement
to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be
indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this
section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
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hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if
he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by
the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf,
and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation,
the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the
entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and
malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as
'provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the
Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the
state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority
for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14).
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2- 403
and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a
presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of
sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence
investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the
offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the
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I N THE EIGHTH J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
O R D E R

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 971800057
Judge A. Lynn Payne

ROGER HOLFELTZ,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Trial Record came on
for hearing on the 30th day of March, 1999, before the Honorable
A. Lynn Payne.

Defendant was present in person and represented

by counsel, Alan M. Williams.

The State was represented by Herb

Gillespie, Duchesne County Attorney, who was counsel at the jury
trial, and JoAnn B. Stringham, Uintah County Attorney.

The Court

having considered the Motion, Objection filed by the State, and
having heard oral arguments, hereby makes the following ruling:
The trial record may be supplemented.
jury trial, counsel was in chambers.

On the day of the

At that time the Court

instructed defense counsel and counsel for the State not to bring
to the attention of the jury the Court's ruling on the Motion to
Suppress.

There was nothing said by the Court to restrict

counsel in any way &t bringing facts to the jury's attention.

CLERK

DEPUTY

DATED this

T

day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

HERB GILLESPIE
S
Duchesne County Attorney
£i itinj. U.
ANN B. STRING
Uintah County Attorney

ALAN M. WILLIAMS
Attorney for Defendant

